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1.

INTRODUCTION

What is the impact of economic sanctions on the protection of
human rights? The literature debates whether sanctions offer an
effective instrument to secure foreign policy goals1 and suggests
causal links between sanctions and leadership change.2 Human
rights scholars examine the unintended adverse impact that
development and democratization exert on the level of human
rights protection;3 the effect that economic intervention has on the
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1
See e.g., GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED
49–50 (3d ed. 2007) (outlining a method for analyzing the utility of economic
sanctions for foreign policy goals); see also Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanctions
Do Not Work, 22 INT’L SECURITY 90, 109 (1997) (suggesting that “the empirical basis
on which advocates have promoted economic sanctions . . . is fundamentally
flawed, and that the deductive logic behind the theory does not consider the
characteristics of modern nation-states that weaken the effectiveness of economic
sanctions”); Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work, 23 INT’L
SECURITY 66, 66 (1998) (arguing that there is “no basis for even qualified optimism
about the effects of sanctions”).
2 See Nikolay Marinov, Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders? 49
AM. J. POL. SCI. 564, 575 (2005) (noting that “[l]ong-run sanctions against some of
the world’s most vicious regimes have done much to obscure the average effect of
economic sanctions.”).
3 See generally Christian Davenport, The Promise of Democratic Pacification: An
Empirical Assessment, 48 INT’L STUD. Q. 539 (2004) (discussing whether
democratization reduces the likelihood of violent repressive activity); see also
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., Thinking Inside the Box: A Closer Look at Democracy
and Human Rights, 49 INT’L STUD. Q. 439, 440 (2005) (“States cannot rapidly
improve human rights conditions by focusing on particular aspects of the
democratization process at the expense of other aspects that appear less strongly
related to the protection of personal integrity rights.”).
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level of that protection;4 and the role of legal systems,5 regime
type,6 reputation,7 and political parties.8
The link between
economic sanctions and human rights remains unexplored. This
Article investigates this very question: do economic sanctions
impact state practice with respect to human rights through shifts in
leadership? Our focus is on physical integrity—the rights to life,
freedom from torture, and humane treatment.9 We proceed by
taking a close look at a subset of cases where states imposed
economic sanctions for reasons other than human rights violations
in the target country.10 We then evaluate the record of rights
protection in the target country before and after the onset of
sanctions.
This Article addresses the impact of leadership change on
human rights protection in four countries: Turkey, Fiji, Pakistan
and Sierra Leone. All four countries were subjected to economic
sanctions, which typically have a destabilizing effect on
4 See Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade
Agreements Influence Government Repression, 59 INT’L ORG. 593, 624 (2005)
(“[Preferential Trade Agreements] are certainly not ideal forms of human rights
governance and they are not a replacement for human rights laws.”); see also M.
Rodwan Abouharb & David L. Cingranelli, The Human Rights Effects of World Bank
Structural Adjustment, 1981-2000, 50 INT’L STUD. Q. 233, 233 (2006) (arguing that
certain “economic changes often cause at least short-term hardships for the
poorest people in less developed countries”). But see David L. Richards, et al.,
Money with a Mean Streak? Foreign Economic Penetration and Government Respect for
Human Rights in Developing Countries, 45 INT’L STUD. Q. 219, 219 (2001) (finding
that “both foreign direct investment and portfolio investment are reliably
associated with increased government respect for human rights.”).
5 See BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
DOMESTIC POLITICS (forthcoming, 2009).
6 See BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA ET AL., THE LOGIC OF POLITICAL SURVIVAL 406
(2005) (“[M]ore resources increase the advantage in the provision of private goods
that leaders with small winning coalitions hold over possible challengers,
increasing their hold on office.”).
7 See George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and
International Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S95, S97 (2002) (“[T]he reputational
consequences of a state’s noncompliance with a given treaty are similarly limited
by the history of its cooperative relationships with the other member states.”).
8 See James Raymond Vreeland, Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why
Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture, 62 INT’L ORG.
65, 93 (2008) (“[D]ictatorships with multiple political parties are more likely to
sign and ratify the CAT.”).
9 These rights fall under the broader category of civil and political rights,
currently regulated under the 1966 United Nations Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.
10 This subset of cases is extracted from HUFBAUER ET AL, supra note 1.
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Distressed leaders often engage in more
governments.11
repression. It follows that in countries where economic sanctions
contributed to shifts in leadership in a timely manner, one should
observe higher levels of human rights protection. Sierra Leone in
1997 illustrates this example.12 Conversely, when there is no
leadership change following the imposition of economic sanctions,
one should observe higher levels of repression. Pakistan in 1999
exemplifies this pattern.13
Surprisingly, in Turkey there was no leadership change
following the 1980 coup and the subsequent imposition of
sanctions, but the level of human rights protection actually
improved. In the same vein, Fiji in 1987 underwent leadership
change, but human rights protection worsened. This Article sets
out to solve the puzzle these two countries present.14 Our findings
suggest that characteristics of their transition to democracy, after
economic sanctions were imposed, carry strong explanatory power
in these two cases.
The Article is structured as follows: Section 2 summarizes the
sanctions literature, focusing on the causal mechanisms associated
See Marinov, supra note 2, at 565.
The civil war in Sierra Leone lasted from 1991 to 2002. The rebel faction
known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) initially organized in 1985
following the rise of Jospeh Momoh, a military leader, but was fueled further by
government corruption and mismanagement of the country’s diamond resources.
The particularly brutal conflict resulted in the breakdown of state institutions and
government control, left approximately 100,000 Sierra Leoneans dead, and caused
the displacement of over 2 million more. Foreign intervention, particularly by
British and UN troops, was instrumental in brokering the ceasefire, but the
country is still extremely fragile and attempting to rebuild following the decade of
conflict.
13 In 1999 Prime Minister Narwaz Sharif was ousted by General Pervez
Musharraf in a bloodless coup. Subsequently, Musharraf suspended Parliament
and the constitution, declared a state of emergency, and named himself chief
executive. The United States was required to impose sanctions under the Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act which stipulates such action be taken when a
democratically elected leader is removed from power. This sanction episode,
rather than the one relating to nuclear testing which was imposed around the
same time, is the focus of this Article. The sanctions in question were lifted
following Pakistan’s support of the United States in the War on Terror in 2001.
Peterson Institute for International Economics, Case Studies in Sanctions and
Terrorism:
Case
99-3,
http://www.petersoninstitute.org/research/topics
/sanctions/pakistanb.cfm (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
14 We follow the research design technique advocated by John Gerring,
identifying “deviant” cases “to probe for new—but as yet unspecified—
explanations.” JOHN GERRING, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES
106 (2007).
11
12
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with levels of success and failure. Section 3 discusses conclusions
about the political economy of human rights protection, again,
concentrating on causal mechanisms of relevance to our research
question.
Section 4 presents case studies, Section 5 offers
theoretical perspectives on future research, and Section 6
concludes.
2.

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND LEADERSHIP SURVIVAL

The benchmark study on economic sanctions is now on its third
edition15 and continues to find that economic sanctions contributed
to their stated goals in about thirty-four percent of the cases.16
Aside from this important finding, two of the study’s conclusions
carry implications for our research question: economic sanctions
are more effective when imposed against democracies; and
sanctions succeed more often when they target friendly nations.17
By contrast, sanctions are more likely to fail when they target
autocratic regimes that insulate themselves from the international
community—precisely countries where human rights violations
are rampant.18
Sanctions seem to carry little direct weight when it comes to
autocratic leaders’ decision to repress their own populations.
However, because sanctions destabilize incumbents, they may
worsen the record of rights protection in the target country
anyway. This intuition derives from the work of Nikolay
Marinov19 and from that of other scholars writing in the Selectorate
model tradition.20

HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 1.
Id. at 159.
17 Id. at 164.
18 See TODD LANDMAN, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
108–11 (2005) (using a series of independent variables such as democracy, wealth,
and involvement in international organizations to conclude that countries
plagued with civil and international war and having large populations are
significantly associated with higher levels of human rights violations).
19 See generally Marinov, supra note 2 (arguing that economic pressure and
sanctions destabilize the targeted nation’s leader).
20 See e.g., BUENO DE MESQUITA ET AL., supra note 6, at 75 (“Leaders stay in
power by raising government revenue through taxation and then spending that
revenue, dividing it between public-goods allocations that benefit everyone in the
society and private rewards that go only to members of the winning coalition.”);
Fiona McGillivray & Allan C. Stam, Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the
Duration of Economic Sanctions, 48 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 154, 164–70 (2004) (testing a
15
16
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Leadership survival is the centerpiece of this research agenda.
Incumbents are primarily concerned with holding on to power; as
a consequence, most policy decisions—from the provision of public
goods, to taxation and repression—are guided by the goal of
survival.21 Authoritarian leaders care even more about survival,
for reasons explained below. Thus, the struggle for political
survival is fundamentally different for democratic incumbents as
opposed to dictators.
The Selectorate model proposes that any polity can be
understood in terms of four features: (1) a winning coalition, or
the group of individuals whose support is essential to keep a
leader in power; (2) a selectorate, or the group who possess the
means to join the winning coalition; (3) the disenfranchised; and (4)
the leader.22 Given this political architecture, scholars writing in
this tradition found a strong association between the size of the
winning coalition and regime type. Autocratic regimes typically
rely on small winning coalitions. It follows that an autocratic
leader needs only to please a select few to remain in power. The
most effective way to accomplish this task is to reward this group
with private goods. Among other advantages, private rewards
bring about more loyalty. Human rights protection lies clearly
outside of the private goods definition, as it is non-excludable and
characterized by non-rival consumption.23 Within this framework,
authoritarian regimes will systematically undersupply the core
human rights: civil liberties, political rights, transparency, and
peace. This expectation is confirmed by empirical research.24
Among the reasons leaders have to suppress human rights, and to
engage in repression, is their own political survival:
Now we turn to what our theory says about the occurrence,
magnitude, and intensity of oppression. . . . First, leaders
theory of sanction duration that focuses on differences between democratic and
nondemocratic states in the structure of leaders’ support coalition).
21 See McGillivray & Stam, supra note 20, at 160 (“We characterize both
nondemocratic and democratic leaders’ goals as ensuring their political
survival.”).
22 See BUENO DE MESQUITA ET AL., supra note 6, at 37, 331–38 (introducing the
Selectorate theory and describing the relevant sets of people within any polity).
23 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 14–16 (Schocken Books 1971) (1965) (characterizing
“nonexcludability” as an element of “public” or “collective” goods).
24 See BUENO DE MESQUITA ET AL., supra note 6, at 338–40 (highlighting various
examples of oppressive political regimes).
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may seek to punish challengers. . . . Second, leaders may
seek to punish members of the selectorate who support a
challenger. . . . Third, leaders may seek to punish the
disenfranchised who might be engaged in revolutionary
action against the regime.25
Furthermore, “small winning-coalition systems not only
provide a strong incentive for leaders to oppress, they also
strengthen this incentive by punishing removed leaders.”26
What role does political survival play in the economic
sanctions debate? According to Marinov, a very important one. In
an article that seeks to mitigate possible selection problems in the
Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, and Oegg study,27 Marinov finds that
economic sanctions are very effective at destabilizing leaders.
Analyzing data on 136 countries, observed over an average of
thirty-seven years, Marinov reports that the risk of losing power
increases by twenty-eight percent with respect to the baseline if an
incumbent leader is the subject of sanctions during that year.28
Hence economic sanctions appear to be intertwined with the
struggle for political survival.
In summary, the state of knowledge with respect to economic
sanctions indicates that they are of limited success as a foreign
policy instrument,29 and that they operate through the imposition
of credible challenges to the political survival of leaders in the
target country.30 Recalling predictions of the Selectorate model
with respect to threats to the political survival of authoritarian
leaders, we expect these leaders to engage in more repression.31
And we emphasize that, within this polity, human rights
protection is already undersupplied. We chose case studies based
on these expectations in Section 4.32 The next Section explores the
recent scholarship on the political economy of human rights. This
Id. at 339–40.
Id. at 343.
27 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 1.
28 Marinov, supra note 2, at 565.
29 See HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 1, at 159 (finding economic sanctions to
have successfully achieved their state policy goals in about 34 percent of cases).
30 Marinov, supra note 2.
31 See BUENO DE MESQUITA ET AL., supra note 6, at 343 (noting that the leaders,
themselves, do not generally carry out the oppressive measures, but, instead,
recruit a large number of people into the “organs of oppression”).
32 Case selection also followed the prescriptions of GERRING, supra note 14.
25
26
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literature uncovers unanticipated adverse consequences that
democratization and development carry with respect to the
protection of rights.
3.

DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR FINDINGS ON ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Contrary to conventional wisdom regarding the beneficial
consequences of economic development and democratization for
the protection of human rights, scholars have recently found that
these two pillars of modern political thought have in fact
unintended adverse effects. In particular, rights to physical
integrity—such as the right to life and the prohibition of torture—
are sensitive in the short-term to developmental and democratizing
pressures. Economic development empowers the lower classes
that, in turn, begin to demand more of the political leadership.
This tension evokes political repression, especially by authoritarian
regimes. Similarly, democratization vents suppressed political
voices, creating tensions that authoritarian leaders prefer to put
down.
Davenport analyzes variations in the level of democratization,
measured through the presence of constraints on executive power,
to investigate if the movement towards full democracy entails a
differentiated response on the part of political leaders.33 He
distinguishes between killings and political repression.34 Based on
data from Freedom House35 and from the political terror scale,36
covering 137 countries over a twenty-year time span, Davenport
concludes that democratizing leaders tend to engage in fewer
killings, but remain repressive.37 In a related inquiry, Bueno de

Davenport, supra note 3.
Id. at 543 (“I disaggregate repression into violent (personal integrity
violations) and non- or less-violent activities (restrictions of political/civil
liberties)”).
35 See
FREEDOM
HOUSE,
FREEDOM
IN
THE
WORLD
(2008),
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15 (last visited Feb. 10, 2009)
(examining the state of civil and political rights in the international community).
36 See Steven C. Poe et al., Repression of the Human Right to Physical Integrity
Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976–1993, 43 INT’L STUD.
Q. 291 (1999) (investigating global human rights violations by various nationstates).
37 See Davenport, supra note 3, at 540 (“Movement toward full constraint (i.e.,
democratization) leads to various combinations of restriction and killing but not
at the highest values of the latter, indicating that repression is tamed.”).
33
34

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

976

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 30:3

Mesquita et al. find that democratization does not improve the
record of rights protection until after the process is almost
completethat is, when states have reached adequate levels of
multiparty competition:
The principal prescriptive message of the analysis appears
to be that those interested in human rights should focus
their time and effort on figuring out how best to promote
broad-based participation and competition. In particular,
the building blocks that help institutionalize democracy do
not appear to yield major gains in respect for human rights
until party competition is normalized . . . . It is unlikely
that one will see dramatic improvements in respect for
human rights as the process of institutionalizing democracy
unfolds. Rather, the payoff comes when the threshold has
been passed in terms of party competition.38
It appears that the road towards improved levels of human
rights protection is more sinuous than initially thought. The first
steps in the direction of full democracy are replete with
opportunities for more repression. When economic sanctions aim
at promoting democracy, they may inadvertently release pressures
that increase the frequency of human rights violations. Certain
strategies to promote economic development show the same
effects. Here, we emphasize World Bank structural adjustment
agreements, as explored by Abouharb and Cingranelli,39 because
we suspect that the same causal mechanism may be at play during
an economic sanctions episode.40
For Abouharb and Cingranelli, the conditions attached to
World Bank packages provoke pressure from adversely affected
segments of society that ultimately lead to tensions with the
government and to repression. Their study analyzes 442 structural
adjustment packages that were awarded between 1981 and 2000.
Despite an initial improvement in human rights attributed to
negotiating pressures (the negotiation hypothesis), ultimately,
during the implementation phase, adjustment agreements bring
about more violations of physical integrity rights:
Bueno de Mesquita et al., supra note 3, at 453.
Abouharb & Cingranelli, supra note 4.
40 For an example of even stronger effects, when compared to World Bank
adjustment agreements, see JAMES R. VREELAND, THE IMF AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (2003) (describing the IMF’s record of prescriptions).
38
39
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The most important substantive finding of this study is that
receiving and implementing a [structural adjustment
agreement] from the World Bank had the net effect of
worsening government respect for all types of physical
integrity rights. This finding is generally consistent with
the findings of previous comparative and case study
research on the human rights effects of IMF [structural
adjustment agreements].41
As mentioned, we believe that similar pressures may result
from economic sanctions. For instance, suspending trade leads to
shortages, higher prices and inflation, which can easily bring about
protests and civil unrest—followed by state-sponsored
repression.42 These findings challenge some fundamental beliefs
concerning human rights guarantees, namely, that democratization
and development unequivocally lead to higher levels of protection.
In the next Section we present two case studies to explore another
widely held belief: that economic sanctions have either positive
consequences for the level of rights protection or no effects at all.
We examine countries that were targeted by economic sanctions,
according to the criteria discussed below, in order to investigate
sanctions’ impact on protection. Case selection sought to identify
typical and deviant cases43 in the economic sanctions dataset of
Hufbauer et al.44
4.

DATA AND CASE STUDIES

This Section takes a closer look at four countries that illustrate
clear patterns of variation on the dependent and independent
variables. The choice of cases and the subsequent analysis was
based on a subset of the database created by Hufbauer et al.,45
excluding: (1) cases that aimed at improving the situation of
Abouharb & Cingranelli, supra note 4, at 256.
To be sure, not all economic instruments behave alike. Certain kinds of
preferential trade agreements as well as foreign economic penetration,
respectively, have a positive impact on rights protection, through significant
reductions in instances of repression. See Hafner-Burton, supra note 4, at 623–24
(discussing the benefits of preferential trade agreements); Richards et al., supra
note 4, at 234 (“Our evidence strongly contradicts the . . . argument that [foreign
economic penetration] will make life worse for citizens of developing countries.”).
43 GERRING, supra note 14, at 106.
44 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 1.
45 Id.
41
42
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human rights in the target country, (2) cases of unilateral sanctions,
and (3) cases prior to 1981. These exclusions seek to eliminate
confounding factors, to concentrate efforts on cases where
sanctions had a higher chance of reaching the stated goal,46 and to
respect limitations in the human rights data.47 Finally, cases were
selected where key variables behaved consistently over time.
These criteria led us to the following cases:
(1) Australia, New Zealand, and India against Fiji (1987–2001);48
(2) United Nations and The Economic Communities of West
African States (“ECOWAS”) against Sierra Leone (1997–2003);49
(3) European Community against Turkey (1981–1986);50
(4) United States and Japan against Pakistan (1999–2001).51
In the first two cases, there was a leadership change after
economic sanctions were imposed.
Whereas human rights
improved in Sierra Leone, as customary thinking would predict,
they actually deteriorated in Fiji! In the last two cases, there was
no leadership change after sanctions were imposed. While in
Pakistan the level of protection went down, as customary thinking
would expect, in Turkey the level actually went up!
These patterns of human rights protection can be observed in
Figure 1, which presents the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human
Rights Dataset’s physical integrity index for each country, between
1981 and 2006.52 The index is a cumulative measure of government
protection of several rights to physical integrity that the authors

46 HUFBAUER ET AL. suggest that international cooperation amongst senders
increases the chances of success of economic sanctions. See id. at 57–59 (applying
an index scaled from 1 to 4 to grade the extent of international cooperation).
47 Freedom House started collecting data on political rights and civil liberties
on 1973. A more comprehensive collection is not available until after 1976. See
FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 35 (providing ratings and reports on 193 countries and
15 disputed territories in democracy and freedom).
48 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 1, at 28.
49 Id. at 32.
50 Id. at 26.
51 Id. at 32.
52 David L. Cingranelli & David L. Richards, The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI)
Human Rights Dataset (2008), http://www.humanrightsdata.org (last visited Feb.
17, 2009).
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assess in a disaggregated manner.53 On this figure, higher values
correspond to higher levels of protection.
FIGURE 1.

6
4
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Level of Protection
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Human Rights Protection (1981-2006)
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1995

2000

2005

Year

Fiji
SierraLeone

Pakistan
Turkey

CIRI physical integrity index. It ranges from 0 (no government protection) to 8 (full protection)

In Fiji, right after sanctions were imposed in 1987, there is an
observable sharp decline in the level of rights protection. In Sierra
Leone, the imposition of sanctions in 1997 is followed by
improvement in rights protection, which is arguably mediated by
the consequences of leadership change—as predicted by the
literature. Pakistan represents yet another typical case, inasmuch
as a dismal human rights record worsens even further, after
sanctions were imposed in 1999. Here again, the predictions of the
literature are just on target, as there was no leadership change.
Turkey’s human rights record is poorly represented in Figure 1,
because CIRI’s data starts on 1981, one year after the coup that put
an end to the second wave of democratization in the country.
Nevertheless, one can see an improvement in the level of rights
protection, which is corroborated by more comprehensive data
53 This is an additive index constructed from four physical integrity variables:
(1) torture; (2) extrajudicial killing; (3) political imprisonment; and (4)
disappearances. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to
8 (full government respect for these four rights). See David L. Cingranelli & David
L. Richards, Measuring the Level, Pattern, and Sequence of Government Respect for
Physical Integrity Rights, 43 INT’L STUD. Q. 407, 409–10 (1999) (describing the
methods used for measuring variations in overall respect for physical integrity
rights by different governments of the world).
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from different sources. Turkey in 1981 illustrates leadership
continuity, despite several steps in the direction of democracy,
thereby contradicting the predictions of the human rights literature
with respect to the level of rights protection.
The puzzle presented by the Turkish and Fijian cases is worth
further exploration. First, the political history of these two
countries around the time they were the target of economic
sanctions must be analyzed. The standard socio-economic and
political variables that have been shown in prior research to impact
human rights protection will also be examined.54 To that end,
yearly data on GDP growth, per capita GNI, population, and
population growth has been collected.55 The political variables
include: (1) the Political Terror Scale,56 which works as an
alternative measure of human rights protection; (2) the Correlates
of War database,57 which indicates whether these countries were
involved in an international armed conflict or in a civil war (or
both) during the ten-year period surrounding the imposition of
sanctions; and (3) the countries’ respective democracy scores, as
measured by Polity IV.58

54 See LANDMAN, supra note 18, at 110 (using a series of independent variables
such as democracy, wealth, and involvement in international organizations to
examine and explain global variation in human rights protection).
55 These
data are from the World Bank Development Indicators,
http://web.worldbank.org (follow “Data and Research” at top; then follow
“Data”; then follow “Data” on sidebar) (last visited Feb. 19, 2009).
56 See Poe et al., supra note 36, at 298 (applying Political Terror Scale to
measure personal integrity rights abuse).
57 See J. David Singer & Melvin Small, Correlates of War Project: International
and Civil War Data, 1816–1992 (1994), available at http://www.dataarchive.ac.uk/doc/3441/mrdoc/ascii/a3441cbk.asc (collecting data on all
international and civil wars from 1816-1992).
58 See Keith Jaggers & Ted Robert Gurr, Tracking Democracy’s Third Wave with
the Polity III Data, 32 J. PEACE RES. 469 (1995) (providing Polity III data for research
on democracy).
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TABLE 1 – CASE STUDIES.
Leadership Change
Yes

No

Down

Fiji
1987–2001

Pakistan
1999–2001

Up

Sierra Leone
1997–2003

Turkey
1981–1986

Level of
Protection

Table 1 summarizes the four possible combinations of shifts in
the level of human rights protection and change in leadership.
Given the strength of the theory and the empirics behind the
notion that leadership change should correspond to higher levels
of protection,59 the majority of the cases should follow the patterns
of Pakistan and Sierra Leone. These are our typical cases.60 In the
next two sections we take a closer look at the Turkish and Fijian
cases, in order to investigate circumstances that may account for
the abnormal consequences of economic sanctions and leadership
survival for rights protection. This effort seeks to explore potential
causal explanations that are thus far omitted in the literature.61

59 See Marinov, supra note 2, at 565 (explaining that if sanctions are effective
in destabilizing leaders, the leaders have an incentive to compromise and produce
policy change); Bueno de Mesquita et al., supra note 3, at 453 (concluding that real
improvements in human rights occur when a society becomes fully democratic).
60 See GERRING, supra note 14, at 91 (explaining the use of typical cases in case
study research).
61 In a recent article Vreeland unfolds new conditions that influence the
practice of torture and countries’ decisions to join the 1984 Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CAT):

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

982

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 30:3

4.1. Turkey
Economic sanctions were imposed on Turkey following the
collapse of democracy in 1980. It was the third time that the
military assumed control of modern Turkey, arguably with the
goal of restoring order and economic progress.62 Normalization
towards democracy was criticized in all three instances, in
particular with respect to the 1983 transition:
One of the main arguments . . . is that all three transitions to
democracy in Turkey (1950, 1961, and 1983) displayed the
essential characteristics of the reform mode of transition—
in which the transition process was initiated and controlled
by the authoritarian power holders—with important
consequences for the ensuing democratic regimes. . . . I
argue that the exclusionary or quasi-exclusionary nature of
the constitution-making processes (the first excluded
former Democrats, and the second excluded all political
parties) adversely affected the stability of the ensuing
democratic regimes, thus depriving the constitutions of
popular legitimacy.63
The 1983 democratization process represents a singular
transition since the head of the state under the military dictatorship
emerged as the newly elected president of the country, under a
constitution that was conceived by the armed forces. Because the
constitution was subject to a national referendum, after

Dictatorships that legally endorse more than one political point of view
by legalizing political parties ironically practice higher levels of torture
than closed dictatorships. The argument follows [the] idea that violence
is higher when power is divided. Dictatorships with political parties face
pressure to adopt policies to co-opt support, including the adoption of
international arrangements such as the CAT.
Vreeland, supra note 8, at 93.
62 See FEROZ AHMAD, THE MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY 181 (1993) (surveying
the 1980 military takeover’s efforts to address “social divisions, the economic
breakdown, and the anarchy and violence”); see generally ERGUN ÖZBUDUN,
CONTEMPORARY TURKISH POLITICS: CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION
(2000) (providing a history of Turkish politics, including the occupation of 1980);
A. Aydin Cecen et al., Economic Growth and Structural Change in Turkey 1960–88, 26
INT’L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 37 (1994) (noting that “in the early 1980s Turkey
ostensibly entered a new era of export-led economic growth”); Ben Lombardi,
Turkey—The Return of the Reluctant Generals?, 112 POL. SCI. Q. 191 (1997).
63 ÖZBUDUN, supra note 62, at 9.
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deliberation of an elected constitutional assembly, the Turkish
transition meets the test and is thereby classified as a
democratization process by two widely adopted indices: Polity,
and the Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, and Przeworski (“ACLP”)
database.64 Given our interest in the consequences of political
survival for the protection of human rights, this Article takes issue
with the circumstances of the Turkish transition. The fact that the
former dictator remained in power after 1983 signals cooptation of
the political sphere and warrants further investigation. Indeed, the
transition did not bring a substantive change to political
institutions in Turkey, despite the ascension of Prime Minister
Turgut Ozal following general elections.65 If anything, it granted
the former dictator, General Kenan Evren, a mantle of legitimacy.66
It was clear that the military retained its tutelage over political
matters.67 For these reasons, Turkey is analyzed here as a country
that was the target of economic sanctions in 1981, following the
collapse of democracy.
However, the 1983 democratization
process in Turkey does not meet our threshold of leadership
change.68 Turkey illustrates a case of economic sanctions that did
not destabilize the regime to the point of political reengineering.
Given the outcome of leadership survival in Turkey following
the imposition of economic sanctions, an increase in human rights
violations is expected. In fact, based on research conducted by
Nikolay Marinov, incumbents that are the target of economic
sanctions are twenty-eight percent more likely to lose power the
following year.69 When placed under that spotlight, authoritarian
64 See Jaggers & Gurr, supra note 58 (providing an explanation of the Polity
project and assessing its validity); Adam Przeworski et al., Political and Economic
Data Codebook and Database, 1999, available at, http://www.ssc.upenn.edu
/~cheibub/data/Default.htm. This dataset is associated with ADAM PRZEWORSKI
ET AL., DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND WELL-BEING IN
THE WORLD, 1950-1990 (2000).
65 See ÖZBUDUN, supra note 62 (noting that only a few political parties were
allowed to compete in the general elections).
66 Id. at 9 (explaining the consequences of the quasi-exclusionary nature of
the constitution-making process).
67 See Amnesty International, Turkey Briefing, I, AI Index EUR/44/65/88
(Nov. 1988) (confirming that the 1982 Constitution “provided for increased
powers for the President, while restricting fundamental rights, and increasing
mechanisms of state control”).
68 See AHMAD, supra note 62, at 186–188 (providing a detailed account of the
undemocratic circumstances under which the constitutional referendum took
place).
69 Marinov, supra note 2, at 565.
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leaders tend to resort to any and all means to tighten their grip on
power, including repression. In this context, economic sanctions
may have the unintended consequence of worsening the human
rights situation in the target country, because leaders prefer to curb
domestic dissent by violent means. In the case of Turkey, the
preoccupation of the Head of State with the country’s image
abroad was aggravated by credible threats of expulsion from the
Council of Europe. During a 1981 visit to Ankara, West Germany’s
Foreign Minister communicated this threat to General Kenan
Evren in unambiguous language.70
Nevertheless, despite expectations that human rights
protection would decrease in Turkey following the 1980 coup and
the subsequent imposition of economic sanctions, several widely
adopted measures of human rights protection contradict this
prediction. Figure 2 clearly shows these trends.
FIGURE 2.
Human Rights Protection in Turkey (1972-2007)
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The graph is unequivocal with respect to the steep
deterioration of human rights protection in 1980, the year of the
coup. But, subsequently, the scores reveal the improvement in
70 AHMAD, supra note 62, at 185 (“He warned the generals that their
repressive measures could lead to Turkey’s expulsion from the Council of Europe
and to the suspension of economic aid so vital for recovery.”).
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rights protection referenced above. The line representing political
rights is even more consistent in its slope, indicating that rights to
physical integrity, the ones captured by the category “political
rights,” enjoyed increased protection.71
Even if improvements in the protection of civil liberties do not
display as strong an increase, the trend is clearly upward.
Moreover, higher levels of protection set in right after the collapse
of democracy in 1981. At that moment, the literature would have
predicted increased levels of repression as the National Security
Council and General Evren focused on power consolidation.
However, during the first years of the dictatorship—still way
ahead of the onset of the 1983 “democratization” process—the
level of human rights protection increased.72 What explains the
Turkish anomaly in light of the findings in the human rights
literature?73 This Article argues that part of the explanation lies in
the accomplishments of General Evren’s regime in the economic
realm, as predicted by the human rights literature itself, but that
other important factors are: (1) the negotiated nature of the
transition, and (2) the economic and political chaos that prevailed
in Turkey before the coup. The quantitative literature on human
rights protection is silent about the latter two. We proceed now to
analyze these aspects of the Turkish case.
The relationship between economic well-being and human
rights protection is well established in the literature.74 Briefly
stated, countries with better economic indicators tend to
experience increased levels of protection. This relationship is

71 This finding is based on aggregate data collected by Freedom House. It is
corroborated in the Political Terror Scale and the CIRI database. C.f. Amnesty
International, supra note 67 (documenting very serious instances of torture, as well
as deaths resulting from torture, during the years 1980-1988).
72 The human rights literature that favors quantitative methods adopts the
practice of lagging the observation of the dependent variable by 3 to 5 years.
Control variables, such as growth, particularly take time to impact the level of
human rights protection. Bueno de Mesquita et al., supra note 3, at 444–45.
73 See Davenport, supra note 3, at 540; Bueno de Mesquita et al., supra note 3,
at 453 (explaining analysis of the data collected on the relationship between
democratic processes and human rights violations).
74 See BUENO DE MESQUITA ET AL., supra note 6, at 102 (suggesting that the
protection of human rights will “promote economic growth and greater national
prosperity”); LANDMAN, supra note 18, at 108–11 (explaining that democracy and
wealth are “significantly associated with lower levels of human rights
violations”).
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clearly mediated by the presence of democratic institutions.75 For
the purposes of the case under analysis—Turkey between 1976 and
1986—the economic indicators speak unambiguously of the terrible
state of the economy during the years that preceded the coup, as
well as of the sharp improvements that Evren’s rule brought about.
The country’s GDP growth rate went from ten percent, in 1976, to
negative two percent, in 1980.
After twelve months of
authoritarian rule, the GDP growth rate was back at five percent a
year. For the next five years, the rate oscillated between four and
seven percent.
With respect to social unrest, the inability of political parties to
form and sustain a viable government led to state paralysis and to
mounting social protests. The dire situation of human rights
protection at that time was documented by Amnesty
International’s report.76 Feroz Ahmad points out the frustration
among the population during the years preceding the breakdown
of democracy:
The public, worn down by the breakdown of law and
order, the galloping inflation and shortages of basic goods,
the squabbles among the parties and the paralysed
parliament, welcomed martial law and the promise of
stability it offered.
Few bargained for the radical
transformation the commanders had in mind or the
ruthless manner in which they implemented their policies.77
In the case of Turkey, we argue that the economic chaos that
preceded the military coup paved the way for the generals.
Without three-digit inflation and close to fifteen percent of the
population unemployed,78 their level of support would have been
much lower in 1980. This is an important point, because the
human rights literature pays little attention to the status quo ante
when studying the impact of economic indicators on human rights
protection.
75 See LANDMAN, supra note 18, at 110 (showing a negative correlation
between democratic government and human rights abuses).
76 “In December 1978 martial law was imposed in 13 provinces in response to
violent riots in the southeastern city of Kahramanmaras, during which over 100
people were killed. During the nine months after the Kahramanmaras riots the
government extended martial law to cover 20 provinces.” Amnesty International,
supra note 67, at 1.
77 AHMAD, supra note 62, at 182.
78 Cecen et al., supra note 62, at 44.
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Another aspect of the Turkish democratization process worth
emphasizing is the negotiated nature of the transition. Similar to
what happened in Brazil in 1985, and in Chile after Augusto
Pinochet, the military chose the terms of the transition and played
a heavy hand in designing the democratic institutions that would
emerge. We argue that negotiated transitions entail a less
repressive shift in power. In fact, because the military had close
oversight of the process, other groups within society moderated
their demands for fear that the military would renege on its
decision to democratize. It follows that the transition became less
contentious, and therefore less violent.79 The absence of repression
in this case had nothing to do with a “benevolent dictator,” but
rather resulted from an attitude of hesitation amongst the
population.
We argue that the combination of all three factors accounts for
the improved level of human rights protection in Turkey, and the
timing in which it occurred, following the onset of military rule in
1980.80 A closer look at Turkey during the ten-year period
surrounding the imposition of economic sanctions does not
disprove the notion that leadership survival is often associated
with more human rights violations. Nevertheless, the Turkish case
sheds light on two factors that the literature should pay attention
to, namely the priors to the economic performance of the
dictatorship and the nature of the transition to democracy.
The role that economic sanctions played is at best unclear. We
do not have strong evidence linking the feeble and controversial
efforts towards democracy to economic pressure visited by the
sanctions. If anything, more credible pressure seems to have come
from Germany’s threat to expel Turkey from the Council of

79 Kathryn Sikkink argues that U.S. foreign policy played an important role in
the level of repression in Latin America, suggesting that foreign policy
characteristics may be a factor in these transitions to democracy. KATHRYN
SIKKINK, MIXED SIGNALS: U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY AND LATIN AMERICA 104
(2004).
80 Vreeland’s argument, that closed dictatorships signal their willingness to
repress so effectively that they actually need to engage in less repression, may
apply here. Vreeland, supra note 8, at 69. There is some evidence that the number
of political killings in Turkey lessened right after the military coup, while other
human rights violations increased. See Amnesty International, supra note 67, at 5
(providing several descriptive examples of human rights oppressions following
the 1980 coup by the military regime in Turkey).
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Europe.81 To reinforce the limited role of economic sanctions in the
Turkish case, Hufbauer et al. classify the cost of sanctions to the
target—both the cost as a percent of GNP and the cost per capita—
as negligible.82
4.2. Fiji
The Fijian case constitutes another interesting puzzle where a
leadership change took place, but the protection of human rights
continued to decline. The benchmark year for the Fijian case is
1987, when Brigadier General Sitiveni Rabuka led military coups in
May and October, arguably to protect indigenous Fijian interests
over those of Fijians of Indian descent (“Indo-Fijians”), who by
then comprised a slight majority of the population. In December of
1987, General Rabuka turned power over to Ratu Sir Penaia
Ganilau, who was Governor-General before the military coup.
General Rubuka went on to proclaim Ganilau the first President of
the Republic of Fiji. Subsequently, an interim civilian government
was appointed.83 This change came after months of struggle
between the two men over who would actually hold executive
authority and over how the island should be governed.84 For our
purposes, it is sufficient to establish that power changed hands at
least once, from Rabuka to Ganilau, following the imposition of
economic sanctions.
Sanctions were imposed by India immediately following the
May 1987 coup, because the coup led to the removal from power of
a legitimately elected coalition government that, although headed
by a Fijian, consisted mainly of Indo-Fijians.85 Australia and New
Zealand, Fiji’s powerful neighbors and trading partners, also
81 See generally AHMAD, supra note 62, at 193 (describing modern Turkey’s
evolution, including military intervention and political and economic
restructuring).
82 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 1, at 119.
83 James Shrimpton, Familiar Faces Lead Fiji as Civilians Take Over, THE
ADVERTISER, Dec. 7, 1987 (describing Fiji’s return to civilian rule, and the parties
involved).
84 Roger Barltrop, Obituary: Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau, THE INDEP., Jan. 3, 1994, at
21 (listing some of Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau’s life events in an obituary).
85 See Ralph Premdas, General Rabuka and the Fiji Elections of 1992, 33 ASIAN
SURV. 997, 998 (1993) (“But in 1987 the governing party lost to a coalition
government led by a Fijian but mainly backed by Indians.”). See Andrew
McEwen, The Crisis in Fiji: Britain Resists Gandhi Pressure for Sanctions, THE TIMES,
May 25, 1987, at 9 (describing India’s attempt to convince Britain to join in
economic sanctions against Fiji until they restored the elected government).
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joined in the trade ban and escalated their measures following the
second coup in October, especially in response to violations of
labor rights.86 All three countries lobbied for others to join the
sanctions effort, particularly Britain with its colonial ties to Fiji.87
While the rest of the world strongly condemned the military coup
in Fiji, no other country joined the sanctions bandwagon.
Fiji became an independent state within the British
Commonwealth in 1970 and until 1987 served as a “model
multiethnic postcolonial democracy.”88 Its transformation to a
multiethnic state began during the colonial period in 1879, when
the British brought South Asians to work the sugar fields.89
Political differentiation between the two groups traces back to
colonial times, when the British granted indigenous Fijians
perpetual rights to tribal lands.
This advantage was
institutionalized by the 1970 Constitution that also guaranteed
ethnic Fijians a majority of seats in an open electoral parliamentary
system.90 Under the convoluted and racially based electoral
system set out in this constitution, Fiji successfully held five
elections that by all accounts were generally free and fair.
However, the victorious party in every one of these elections was
the Melanesian-dominated Alliance Party; and, the only Prime
Minister elected was Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara.
After seventeen years of comfortably holding onto power, and
amid allegations of corruption and mismanagement, the Alliance
Party narrowly lost out to a multiracial Labor-Federation
coalition.91 Throughout the campaign, the Alliance Party exploited
86 Matthew Moore, ACTU Puts Ban on Maritime Trading; Rabuka’s Second Coup,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Sept. 29, 1987, at 12; see Stephen Taylor, Tensions Raise
Fears of Fiji Violence: Rebel Regime in Suva Faces Pressure from Pacific Neighbours, THE
TIMES, Sept. 26, 1987 (“The strongest condemnations came from Australia and
New Zealand, who will now consider methods, including economic sanctions, of
bringing the military regime swiftly to its knees.”).
87 McEwen, supra note 85.
88 Andrew Scobell, Politics, Professionalism, and Peacekeeping: An Analysis of the
1987 Military Coup in Fiji, 26 COMP. POL. 187, 187 (1994).
89 Id. at 187–88.
90 Id. at 189. See also MONTY G. MARSHALL & KEITH JAGGERS, CTR. FOR SYSTEMIC
PEACE, POLITY IV COUNTRY REPORT 2006: FIJI 2 (2006), http://www.systemicpeace
.org (last visited Mar. 2, 2009) (“Fijian politics has been characterized by a strong
indigenization movement since its adoption of an open electoral parliamentary
system upon independence in 1970.”).
91 See Scobell, supra note 88, at 191 (“The election of April 5-11, 1987, brought
a slim victory for the Coalition: it won twenty-eight seats to the Alliance’s twentyfour.”).
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fears of Communism and painted the challengers as radical
leftists.92 In the aftermath of this campaign, the newly elected
Prime Minister Dr. Timoci Bavadra unfolded his plan to drastically
reduce the military—later labeled one of his most threatening
proposals and probably the most influential in his overthrow.93
The Royal Fijian Military Forces (“RFMF”) had gained great
respect within the country and grew exponentially after it began
participating in peacekeeping missions abroad in 1978.94 As the
RFMF rose in prominence so did coup leader Rabuka, causing
some authors (such as Scobell) to find that attributing the coup
solely to ethnic hostility is simplistic and that Rabuka was mainly
interested in safeguarding his personal interests.95 Regardless of
Rabuka’s personal motivations, he succeeded in exacerbating the
atmosphere of ethnic tension with proclamations such as “Fiji for
Fijians!”96 He also implemented a propaganda campaign aimed at
exploiting religious differences between indigenous Christians and
Indo-Fijian Hindus.97 This political environment persisted under
Ganilau’s civilian government, leading to a mass exodus of IndoFijians and to Fiji’s expulsion from the Commonwealth of Nations,
an international boycott, and foreign censure.98
It is against this background that we observe the level of
human rights protection in Fiji for the years 1972–2007. Figure 3
displays Freedom House scores for political rights and civil
liberties in Fiji.
The steep worsening of rights protection,
represented by higher scores in the graph, is clearly noticeable in
1987 following the political turmoil. Political rights scores are
visibly worse, especially when compared to pre-coup levels.

Id.
Id. at 191, 195 (“[T]he critical factor [in the 1987 coup] was the RFMF’s
perception of the new Coalition government as procommunist and antimilitary.”).
94 Id. at 190.
95 See, e.g., id. at 192 (arguing that ethnic tensions did not “precipitate” the
coup).
96 Premdas, supra note 85, at 997.
97 See STEPHANIE LAWSON, TRADITION VERSUS DEMOCRACY IN THE SOUTH
PACIFIC: FIJI, TONGA AND WESTERN SAMOA 64 (1996) (“Indeed, Rabuka’s own
propaganda campaign can only be interpreted as a manipulation to maximum
advantage of the plural society syndrome.”).
98 Premdas, supra note 85, at 997.
92
93
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FIGURE 3.
Human Rights Protection in Fiji (1972-2007)
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As we can see, for both political rights and civil liberties
protection, the worst year was 1987. Following the second coup in
October, Rabuka suspended civil rights by decree, “assuming
powers of detention without trial, [suspending] [a]ll political and
trade union activity . . . and [providing] the army-backed
government [with] . . . the right to restrict the movement of people,
including departures from the country.”99
The extent to which this decline in the level of human rights
protection is attributable to economic sanctions is the question to
which we now turn. After 1987, an interim civilian government
was put in place, and although the situation improved slightly,
repression continued and ensured Rabuka’s goals. This interim
government was responsible for drafting the new constitution,
which—although reviewed by several bodies—was put into effect
99

Around the World: Fiji Coup Leader Limits Civil Rights with Decree, THE GLOBE
26, 1987.

AND MAIL, Oct.
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“without first being released for public scrutiny.”100 The result was
a document that was “ethnically inegalitarian [sic] . . . [and]
assigned electoral preeminence to the minority Fijians over the
combined majority of Indians, Europeans, Chinese, Mixed Races,
and Other Pacific Islanders.”101 In addition to the advantage
granted to indigenous Fijians, ethnic groups were clearly
delineated and electoral participation could only take place within
these confines.102 The constitution also reflected other disparities
of Fijian society. Provincial divisions were skewed so that less
dense constituencies received more seats than more populated
urban areas, with the goal of minimizing the influence of areas that
had helped the Labor Federation Party win in 1987, and to
consolidate power with the traditionally important tribal chiefs
based in the east.103 One author sums up: “Although the
constitution of the Sovereign Democratic Republic of Fiji sets up a
form of elective parliamentary rule, even the most generous of
interpretations cannot disguise the non-democratic nature of its
political institutions.”104
The contentious nature of the democratization process in Fiji
lies at the root of their dismal situation with respect to human
rights after 1987. This argument finds support in human rights
literature, especially the work of Davenport, who assesses the
consequences of democratization on protection of human rights
under two headings: political restrictions and killings. Davenport
writes:
[Observers] would expect democratization to decrease
restriction as well as killing for this form of regime change
represents an increased respect for human life and political
freedom. It may be the case, however, that the various
commitments made and mechanisms developed during the
process of regime change are partial or unstable in nature,

LAWSON, supra note 97, at 64–65.
Premdas, supra note 85, at 997.
102 See id. at 999 (outlining the features of the 1990 constitution and its
radically different electoral system).
103 See Premdas, supra note 85, at 999-1000 (highlighting the historical
developments that created this eastern-western political rift).
104 LAWSON, supra note 97, at 75.
100
101
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whereby democratic change would decrease killing, but
would have no impact on the use of political restrictions.105
To corroborate Davenport’s predictions that states undergoing
democratization may experience an increase in levels of repression
and fewer killings,106 we review CIRI’s data on Fiji, finding that
extrajudicial killings worsened in the actual year of the coup but
then returned to pre-coup levels, whereas political imprisonment
and torture increased from the year of the coup until the
implementation of the new constitution.107 Clearly, the Fijian case
confirms what Davenport labels as “the tanning effect,” which is a
reduction in instances of killings. We find that the human rights
violations captured by some of the aggregate measures of rights
protection, such as Freedom House scores displayed in Figure 1,108
correspond to instances of political restrictions and can be
explained by the democratization argument.
So far, no evidence that economic sanctions are to blame for the
abysmal situation of human rights in Fiji following the 1987
military coup has been found.109 We support Hufbauer et al. in
their assertion that economic sanctions had “little or no
contribution” to the political outcome.110 To the extent that
sanctions played any role at all, they pushed the democratization
agenda, which took several more years to accomplish. During this
timeframe, leadership change in Fiji should have mitigated the
Davenport, supra note 3, at 545.
Id. at 540 (predicting that state movement “toward democracy [that]
confront[s] diverse forms of conflict proves to be hazardous for citizen’s rights”).
107 Cingranelli & Richards, supra note 52.
108 FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 35 (showing that the level of human rights
protections precipitously drop between 1985 and 1990).
109 The massive emigration of Indo-Fijians following the coup suggests that
they, as a group, faced particularly harsh limitations on their rights. According to
research by the Asia Pacific Migration Research Network, Indo-Fijians comprised
91% of emigrants between 1987-1995 due to “political uncertainty, lack of security
for land, and the current overall discriminatory treatment.” The decision of many
to flee was probably influenced by a few well-publicized incidents like the arrest
of sociologist and Labour stalwart Dr. Naidu who was imprisoned, blindfolded,
gagged and beaten up under the ambiguously worded anti-sedition law. IndoFijians began to leave the country in droves, with approximately 40,000, of the
80,000 that came in between 1973-1994, leaving after the coups. For quotes and
data, see Asia Pacific Migration Research Network, Issues Paper from Fiji: Migration
Issues in the Pacific, http://www.unesco.org/most/apmrnwp6.htm (last visited
Feb. 10, 2009).
110 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 1, at 80 (labeling the policy result of sanctions
imposed on Fiji as having “little or no contribution”).
105
106
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unintended adverse consequences of the democratization
process—and perhaps it did, but with respect to killings only.
Levels of repression remained high almost until 2000, when they
finally declined to the pre-coup threshold.111
The Fijian case study reinforces the need to analyze human
rights data at the disaggregated level, given that consequences
associated with leadership change may vary with respect to what
Davenport has labeled the “taming” versus the “pacifying”
effects.112 This case also speaks to the need for further research on
democratization processes, especially those where leadership
change takes place, precisely because of expectations grounded in
the literature—namely that transitions will occur without major
setbacks for human rights protection.
5.

FURTHER RESEARCH

Given the pioneer nature of this investigation and the inherent
limitations of its research design, several intervening factors were
overlooked. The inductive approach to typical and deviant cases113
limited the analysis to independent variables that had meaning in
these cases, thus neglecting trends in the literature that might as
well carry explanatory power in a large quantitative study. Next,
two frameworks that warrant close scrutiny in future research are
emphasized.
Writing about the making, breaking, and reforming of
international legal norms, Goldsmith and Posner propose that
compliance with human rights is motivated by symmetric and
asymmetric cooperation.114 In their view, state respect for human
rights follows a logic of self-interested behavior, as opposed to the

See FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 35, Fig.1.
Davenport, supra note 3, at 545. According to Davenport, “taming” occurs
in democratizing States when “the various commitments made and mechanisms
developed during the process of regime change are partial or unstable in nature,
whereby democratic change would decrease killing, but would have no impact on
the use of political restrictions.” “Pacifying” occurs in States that have completed
democratizaion to the point that “the uncertainty and anxiety experienced in
transitional societies is gone.”
113 See GERRING, supra note 14.
114 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
113 (2005) (proposing that human rights cooperation becomes possible once we
acknowledge the possibility that some states care about human rights abuses
committed in other states).
111
112
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normative weight of an international legal system.115 They proceed
by explaining how nationals in one state are often concerned with
the well-being of co-nationals, co-religionists, or co-ethnics who
form a minority in another state.116 According to Goldsmith and
Posner, this symmetric logic explains respect for human rights
amongst states. There is also room for asymmetric cooperation,
which plays an important role in democratic regimes.117 In the
latter, voters who lack any ethnic or religious ties to the victims of
human rights violations in another state demand that their own
government take measures to raise the level of rights protection in
that state. Economic sanctions are only one of such measures.118
Based on the framework proposed by Goldsmith and Posner, it
appears that religious, ethnic, or other socio-cultural ties between
the country that imposes economic sanctions and the target
country may play a role in the impact those sanctions have on
human rights protection in the target country. This impact is
mediated by pressures on leadership survival, as discussed earlier.
Thus, following the logic of symmetric cooperation,119 it seems
reasonable to expect any adverse impacts of economic sanctions on
human rights to be milder in countries that have religious, ethnic,
or other socio-cultural ties with the nation imposing sanctions.
Conversely, in the absence of these linkages, sanctions episodes
that fit the pattern of “leadership survival” cases are likely to be
associated with the worst level of rights protection.120
The work of Andrew Moravcsik provides a second framework
for analysis.121 Moravcsik analyzed states’ preferences with respect
to a strong regional human rights regime in Europe in the
aftermath of World War II. Surprisingly, he found that newly
established democracies displayed greater support for such a

115 Id. at 111 (explaining that the “relative absence of genocide and crimes
against humanity, reflects a conscience of interest”).
116 Id. at 113.
117 Id. at 114 (describing how Great Britain’s asymmetric cooperation served
to curtail the slave trade worldwide).
118 Id. at 116 (describing how U.S. “financial might” enabled the prosecution
of certain Yugoslavian war criminals).
119 Id. at 113.
120 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
121 Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic
Delegation in Postwar Europe, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 622 (Beth A. Simmons & Richard H. Steinberg eds., 2006).
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human rights regime122 compared to older democracies.123 The
explanation, according to Moravcsik, lies in newly-established
democracies’ desire to lock in the gains from the democratization
process. By delegating to a powerful judicial body—in this case,
the European Court of Human Rights—new democracies and their
leaders insulate themselves from authoritarian forces.124
A similar dichotomy appears to apply to countries that are
targeted by economic sanctions. Sanctions are typically more
effective against democracies.125 But could sanctions be even more
effective when they target newly-established democracies? If so,
are there consequences for human rights protection in these
countries, given the pressures that are inherent to the
democratization process itself?126 Subsequent research should
exhaust these intervening variables, especially if a large-N
quantitative study is pursued.
6.

CONCLUSION

This project’s initial goal was to investigate the impact that
economic sanctions have on human rights protection through the
operation of shifts in the target country’s political leadership.
Building on three different strands of literature, the Authors
reached the following conclusions: economic sanctions tend to be
less effective against dictatorships127 because threatened dictators

122 Id. at 638 (observing that the willingness of a state to recognize
compulsory jurisdiction of and allow individual petitions to international courts
are good measures of the state’s willingness to accept human rights obligations
generally).
123 Id. at 638–39 (discussing similarities between established and transitional
democracies in their hesitancy to accept regional human rights obligations).
124 Id. at 642 (noting that combating domestic threats to democracy was “the
most consistent public justification” for membership in the European Court of
Human Rights).
125 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 1, at 166–68 (presenting data suggesting that
democracies are more willing to accommodate the “sender’s” demands than
autocratic regimes).
126 See, e.g., Davenport, supra note 3, at 540 (noting that states experience
“various combinations of restrictions and killing” as they progress toward
democratization). See also Bueno de Mesquita et al., supra note 3, at 453
(discussing relationships between development of democratic institutions and
human rights protection).
127 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 1, at 166 (noting that evidence suggests
autocratic regimes are less susceptible to economic sanctions than democratic
governments).
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often engage in more repression,128 and because economic
sanctions destabilize dictators at higher rates.129 Thus, economic
sanctions have an adverse impact on rights protection in autocratic
societies.
A cursory look at a select group of economic sanctions episodes
led to classification of the cases according to two main variables:
leadership survival and shifts in human rights protection. Cases
that contradicted the literature’s standard explanations included
Turkey in 1980 and Fiji in 1987. In Turkey, rights protection
improved, despite the fact that the dictator remained in control;
while in Fiji, rights protection worsened following leadership
change. This puzzle deserved further investigation.
The Authors proceeded to study the political history of Turkey
around the time of the 1980 military coup. This investigation was
guided by several findings in the human rights literature that had
relevant implications, particularly regarding the relationship
between human rights and economic growth, population growth,
political parties, international conflict, and civil war.130 The
Authors conclude that economic growth holds a powerful
explanation for the improvement in rights protection following the
collapse of democracy in Turkey. Also, it seems that pre-coup
political chaos heightened the impact of good growth in the
aftermath of the transition. Finally, the negotiated nature of the
Turkish transition resulted in fewer instances of violent repression.
The Authors took a similar approach with Fiji. Here, political
historians emphasized ethnic tensions, the nature of the military,

128 See Bueno de Mesquita et al., supra note 3, at 451 (noting that human rights
violations increase in states that have attained “intermediate” levels of
democracy).
129 But see Marinov, supra note 2, at 573 (observing that democratic regimes
suffer “much more government instability” under the pressure of sanctions).
130 See SIMMONS, supra note 5. See also BUENO DE MESQUITA ET AL., supra note 6
(applying theory examining political expediency and consequences of various
domestic and foreign policy alternatives). Compare Vreeland, supra note 8 at 69
(noting that multi-party dictatorships tend to have higher levels of torture), and
Hafner-Burton, supra note 4 (examining relationships between human rights and
international trade agreements), and Richards et al., supra note 4 (discussing
possible relationships between foreign investment and human rights protections),
and Downs and Jones, supra note 7 (emphasizing the role of reputational concerns
in regimes’ decisions to comply with international human rights obligations), with
Abouharb & Cingranelli, supra note 4 (discussing the human rights implications of
World Bank economic liberalization requirements and arguing that the World
Bank SAAs warn government respect for human rights).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

998

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 30:3

and civil-military relations as key explanations for the 1987 coup.131
Though these ad-hoc arguments offered valuable insight, there was
a deeper connection to the explanations offered in the human
rights literature. Among that literature, the work of Christian
Davenport emerged as a key to the Fijian puzzle.132 It seems clear
that the democratization process in Fiji was very contentious—
partly because of the factors identified by political historians. It
was indeed a case where increased levels of repression were
accompanied by fewer killings, and thereby an instance where
democratization realized its “taming” effect, falling short of full
“pacification.”133
When targeted by economic sanctions, will countries that
experience leadership change be able to merely tame repression?
Will countries with a strong economy be able to pacify dissent
more effectively?
These questions have important policy
implications, as we seek a better understanding of the foreign
policy tools. Human rights advocates will benefit from uncovering
the unintended adverse consequences for human rights that follow
from otherwise popular policies. These are questions the Authors
intend to explore in future research.

131 See Scobell, supra note 88, at 192 (weighing the impact of ethnic tension
and military-political issues on the May 1987 coup).
132 See Davenport, supra note 3, at 544–45 (describing the “taming” effect that
occurs in democratic transitions where killings decrease, but the government
continues to impose repressive political restrictions).
133 Id.
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